The Lost War
In the most recent edition of The New York Review of Books Mark Danner makes clear exactly why the Iraq War has to be regarded as a loss for the US. Danner is commenting on a recently released transcript of a conversation between George W. Bush and Spanish President (at the time) José Marìa Aznar on February 22, 2003, about a month before the war began. At that point the US was hoping to get a second resolution through the UN Security Council which would authorize the use of force but was having trouble getting the support of the Council’s temporary members such as Mexico, Chile and Angola. Bush was full of bullying, ready to open a can of whoop-ass on them if they didn’t support the US:
[Chilean President Ricardo] Lagos has to know that the Free Trade Agreement with Chile is pending Senate confirmation, and that a negative attitude on this issue could jeopardize that ratification. Angola is receiving funds from the Millennium Account that could also be compromised if they don't show a positive attitude. And Putin must know that his attitude is jeopardizing the relations of Russia and the United States.
Danner comments:
What is striking about this passage is not only how crude and clumsy it is, with the President of the United States spouting threats like a movie gangster—he presumably wants the Spaniard to convey them directly to the various leaders—but how ineffective the bluster turned out to be. None of these countries changed their position on a second resolution, which, in the event, was never brought before the Security Council to what would have been certain defeat. Bush, in making the threats, did the one thing an effective leader is supposed always to avoid: he issued an order that was not obeyed, thus demonstrating the limits of his power. (The Iraq war itself, meant as it was to "shock and awe" the world and particularly US adversaries, did much the same thing.)
